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CASE COMMENTS
CHAOTIC SENTENCING: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES BASED ON
EXTRAORDINARY FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES
United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992)
In United States v. Johnson,1 the Second Circuit held that a sentencing
court may depart from the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
"Guidelines") 2 on the basis of a defendant's extraordinary family
circumstances. 3
A jury convicted the defendant, Cynthia Johnson, of theft, conspiracy,
and bribery.4 Although the nature of Johnson's crimes generated an of-
fense level under the Guidelines of twenty-three,5 the district court judge
for the Southern District of New York subtracted ten offense levels due
to the defendant's burdensome family responsibilities.6
1. 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.]. The United States Sentencing Guidelines were set forth by the United States Sentencing
Commission, which Congress created in accordance with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2040 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3566, 3571-3586 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)). For an overview of the Guidelines,
see generally Thomas W. Hutchison & David Yellen, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE
(1989); Andrew von Hirsch et al., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES (1987).
3. The scope of this Comment is limited to the issue of whether a court's downward departure
from the United States Sentencing Guidelines on the basis of extraordinary family circumstances is
consistent with congressional intent, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the Sentencing
Guidelines.
4. 964 F.2d at 126. In the spring of 1989, one of Johnson's coworkers at the Bronx Veterans
Administration Hospital devised a scheme to steal money by inflating paychecks. Id. Johnson
knowingly accepted inflated paychecks from this coworker, who was a payroll clerk at the hospital.
Id. Johnson then sought out other hospital employees and offered to inflate their paychecks. Id.
For each employee who accepted the offer, Johnson and the payroll clerk received one-half of the
overpayment on each check issued. Id.
5. Under the Guidelines, a judge must first determine the base offense level and then make
various additions and subtractions consistent with the Guidelines. In Johnson, the court derived the
offense level of 23 from various additions to the base offense level required under the Guidelines.
Based on § 2C1.l(a) the sentencing judge first calculated a base offense level of 10 for the bribery
counts. Id. The judge then added two levels because Johnson made multiple bribes, § 221.I(b)(1);
and five levels because the amount of Johnson's bribes exceeded $40,000. Finally, the judge added
four levels for Johnson's participation in the organization of the criminal activities, § 3Bl.l(a); and
two levels for obstructing justice, § 3CI.1. Id.
6. Id. The judge also deducted two levels because, in his opinion, Johnson's crime resembled
theft more than bribery, and deducted one additional level because the defendant shared the pro-
ceeds with her coworker. Id.
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The judge found that Johnson was a single mother, and that she had
the sole responsibility for raising her own three children and her institu-
tionalized daughter's six-year-old child.7 The court then imposed a sen-
tence of six months of home detention followed by three years of
supervised release.' The government appealed the offense level reduction
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
ruled that extraordinary family circumstances may warrant a downward
departure from the offense levels specified in the Guidelines.9
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Sentencing
Reform Act")10 to ensure that defendants found guilty of similar crimes,
who possess similar criminal records, will receive consistent sentences.t'
Through the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress established the United
States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") 12 to draft a set of
guidelines that provide for consistent sentencing and allow for flexibility
if mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist.1 3
In 1987, Congress approved the Commission's initial sentencing guide-
lines for individual defendants. 4 The Guidelines direct a sentencing
court to calculate an appropriate sentence by first determining the base
offense level that corresponds to the crime which the defendant commit-
7. Id. at 126, 130. The judge also noted that in addition to raising her three young children
and her daughter's child, Johnson also raised a 17-year-old son. Neither the father of the 17-year-
old nor the father of the five and six-year-old children contributed to their respective support. Id. at
130. Moreover, the father of the five-month-old infant was unemployed, and the defendant's institu-
tionalized daughter was also incapable of providing financial support. Id.
8. Id. at 126. The court also required Johnson to provide restitution in the amount of
$27,973. Id.
9. Id. at 128-29.
10. See supra note 2.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988). In imposing sentences, courts "need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct." Id. See also S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 38-59 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3220-43.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
13. One purpose of the Sentencing Commission is to:
[P]rovide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individu-
alized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into ac-
count in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
14. The Commission retained the power to amend the Guidelines under the authority of 28
U.S.C. § 994(a). Periodically, the Commission prepares amendments which are published in the
Federal Register with a stated effective date. If Congress does not take action prior to the specified
effective date, the amendments become law. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).
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ted.1 5 Then the court should add or subtract offense levels based on the
specific characteristics of the defendant's crime.16 Once the court adjusts
the offense level, it evaluates the defendant's criminal history and ascer-
tains the appropriate sentencing range. 7 However, a court may depart
from the Guidelines when the case presents circumstances which the
Commission did not consider when promulgating the Guidelines. 8
Yet, in the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress did not clearly address
the significance of family ties and responsibilities to sentencing determi-
nations.9 Consequently, the Commission failed to formulate a con-
clusive rule regarding sentencing departures based on family
circumstances.20 The only pertinent language in the Guidelines is not
contained within a specific provision, but rather is found in one of the
policy statements the Commission drafted to accompany the Guide-
lines.21 Policy Statement section 5H1.6 provides that "family ties and
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sen-
tence should be outside the applicable guideline range."'22 Differing in-
15. Matthew Kipp & Bruce M. Selya, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1991).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
19. For example, § 3661 provides that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con-
cerning the background... of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3661.
Another provision, however, states that the Commission should only consider family ties and re-
sponsibilities "to the extent that they do have relevance" to the sentencing decision. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(d)(7) (1988). The very next provision of § 994 narrows the applicability of family circum-
stances even further. Section 994(e) of the Act instructs the Commission to "assure that the guide-
lines and policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of
imprisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the ... family ties and responsi-
bilities ... of the defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988).
20. Susan E. Ellingstad, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures Based on a Defend-
ant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Respansibilities, 76 MINN. L. REv. 957, 970 (1992).
21. Congress distinguished policy statements from sentencing guidelines in the Sentencing Act.
Johnson, 964 F.2d at 127. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (guidelines are "for use of a sentencing
court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case") with 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)
(policy statements are instructions in regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of
sentencing or sentence implementation).
Policy statements differ from guidelines, which impose sentences, because policy statements ad-
dress whether certain characteristics have any relevance to sentencing. Although not bound by pol-
icy statements, judges must consider them when determining an appropriate sentence. PRACTICE
UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 81, 86 (Phylis S. Bamberger ed. 1988).
22. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.6 (Policy Statement). Policy Statement § 5H1.6 provides:
"Family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. Family responsibilities that are
Washington University Open Scholarship
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terpretations of the language "not ordinarily relevant" by the federal
appellate courts have led to a split among the circuits on the sentencing
departure issue.23
In United States v. Thomas,24 the Seventh Circuit held that a sentenc-
ing judge may never depart downward from the Guidelines on the basis
of a defendant's extraordinary family circumstances.2" The defendant in
Thomas was the sole provider for two of her three mentally disabled
adult children and the legal guardian of her four-year-old grandchild.26
The court based its decision to reverse the district court's downward de-
parture on a literal reading of Policy Statement section 5H1.6.27 This
policy provision provides that courts can consider family circumstances
when deciding whether to impose probation or when determining the
complied with may be relevant to the determination ofthe amount of restitution or fines." U.S.S.G.,
supra note 2, § 5Hl.6 (Policy Statement) (as amended Nov. 1, 1991).
The Sentencing Commission's directives regarding departures from the Guidelines appear in the
policy statements concerning specific offender characteristics. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, §§ 5H1.I-
5H1.3, 5H1.5, 5H1.6 (Policy Statements).
23. Most of the policy statements concerning specific offender characteristics invoke the lan-
guage "not ordinarily relevant." See, eg., U.S.S.G., supra note 2, §§ 5H1.1-5HI.3, 5HI.5, 5H1.6
(Policy Statements). As a result of the vague language used by the Commission in these policy
statements, courts addressing issues involving offender characteristics generally hold that extraordi-
nary circumstances warrant a sentencing departure.
For example, § 5H1.1 states that a defendant's age "is not ordinarily relevant" for purposes of
sentencing departures. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.1 (Policy Statement). Courts, however, inter-
pret this language as permitting departures based upon extraordinary age factors. See, e.g., United
States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 69 (4th Cir. 1990). In addition, § 5H1.2 declares educational and
vocational skills not ordinarily relevant, yet courts find that such characteristics, if extraordinary,
justify departures. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.2 (Policy Statement); see, e.g, United States v.
Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Other factors are generally irrelevant except in extraordi-
nary cases--e.g., age, education and family and community ties.") (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 2,
§§ 5Hl.1, 5H1.2, 5HI.6 (Policy Statements)). Likewise, mental and emotional conditions are not
ordinarily relevant to sentencing deviations. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5HI.3 (Policy Statement).
Again, however, courts conclude that extraordinary mental or emotional conditions warrant down-
ward departures. See, eg., United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 516-17 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1427 (1991). In § 5H1.5, the Commission stated that a defendant's previous
employment record is not ordinarily relevant to departure determinations. U.S.S.G., supra note 2,
§ 5H1.5 (Policy Statement). Courts interpret this language as allowing departures in extraordinary
prior employment situations. United States v. Jagmohan, 909 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1990).
For a comprehensive examination of those courts interpreting the language of § 5H1.6 as permit-
ting downward sentencing departures in the face of extraordinary family circumstances, see infra
notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
24. 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
25. Id. at 530.
26. Id. at 529.
27. Id. at 530.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/9
1993] FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE GUIDELINES
length and conditions of supervised release. 28 The court concluded that
section 5H1.6 evidenced the Commission's intention to allow a sentenc-
ing court to consider family circumstances only in these limited circum-
stances.2 9 Because the defendant's offense required that she serve a
prison sentence,3" the court held that any downward departure based on
family circumstances was improper.31 Moreover, the court noted that
the Commission failed to authorize expressly downward departures
based upon extraordinary family circumstances in section 5H1.6,
whereas it expressly provided for departures based on extraordinary cir-
cumstances in another policy statement.32 The court reasoned that its
holding reflected the Guidelines' underlying rationale of basing a defend-
ant's sentence on the nature of the crime rather than on the defendant's
personal characteristics.33
The Eighth Circuit generally adopted this restrictive approach in
United States v. Sutherland,34 but has held that unusual family circum-
stances may justify a downward departure in certain cases.35 In Suther-
28. Id. The Sentencing Commission later amended the policy statement contained in § 5H1.6
in 1991, and thereby eliminated the statement denoting the relevance of family responsibilities with
respect to probation and supervised release but retained the statement regarding fines and restitu-
tions. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.6 (Policy Statement). See supra note 22 for the relevant text of
§ 5H1.6.
29. 930 F.2d at 530. The court stated that § 5H6.1 contains no language indicating that these
enunciations are examples, rather than an exhaustive list. Id. Furthermore, the court found no
language in § 5H6.1 to suggest that a sentencing judge possesses the power to depart from the
Guidelines on a discretionary determination that family circumstances are compelling. Id.
30. Id. at 528. The court convicted the defendant of possessing almost four kilograms of her-
oin. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates a 10-year prison sentence for violations involving more than
one kilogram of heroin. A court cannot impose probation or a suspended sentence. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(l)(A) (1988).
31. 930 F.2d at 530.
32. Id. As an example, the court cites the policy statement § 5H1.4, which provides in perti-
nent part: "Physical condition . . . is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range. However, an extraordinary physical impairment
may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range .. " U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 5H1.4 (Policy Statement).
33. 930 F.2d at 530 (explaining that "of the fifteen grounds for departure listed in [Chapter 5,
Part K of the Guidelines] not a single one looks to characteristics of the defendant: ten factors
examine the specific criminal conduct and the resulting harm, and five relate to the defendant's
mental capacity or motive at the time of the conduct") (citing United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d
244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990)).
34. 890 F.2d 1042 (8th Cir. 1989).
35. See, eg., United States v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is
legally possible for family circumstances to justify a departure); United States v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564,
565 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that departure is justified for family circumstances in a typical case). In
addition to the division within the Eighth Circuit, a split of authority exists in the Fourth Circuit. In
Washington University Open Scholarship
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land, the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that his
unusual family circumstances warranted a downward departure.36 The
court reasoned that the defendant's argument lacked merit in light of the
Commission's statement that family ties are not ordinarily relevant.37 In
United States v. Shortt,31 however, the Eighth Circuit took the opposite
view and held that under section 5H1.6 extraordinary family circum-
stances may warrant a departure.39 The defendant in Shortt urged the
judge to depart downward, arguing that a prison sentence would detri-
mentally affect his family because he was the family's sole source of in-
come, his wife had a history of substance abuse, and he helped his
disabled father operate the family farm.' In declining to depart, the
court noted that the defendant's brothers could help their father farm
and that the defendant's wife had recovered from her substance abuse
problems.41 The court held that the defendant's case did not present ex-
traordinary circumstances because all families suffer when one member is
incarcerated, thus explaining why family circumstances are not ordina-
rily relevant in sentencing determinations.42
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue have held that
the Guidelines permit sentencing judges to base a downward departure
on extraordinary family circumstances, but these courts have yet to deem
any set of circumstances extraordinary.4 3 For example, in United States
United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990), the court held that family circumstances and
community ties cannot serve as bases for downward sentencing departures unless probation is a
sentencing option. Id. at 248. This probation provision was later omitted in an amendment of the
Guidelines. See supra note 28. However, in United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990),
the Fourth Circuit held that § 5H1.6 of the Guidelines permits departures in the face of extraordi-
nary family circumstances. Id. at 919. See United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 585 (1990).
36. 890 F.2d at 1043.
37. Id.
38. 919 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 1328.
40. Id. at 1326.
41. Id. at 1328.
42. Id. Although the court held that a defendant's family circumstances may legally justify a
downward departure, this defendant's situation was not outside the "heartland" of cases which the
Guidelines cover (relying on U.S.S.G., supra note 2, ch.1, pt.A, Introduction 4(b) (Departures)).
43. See, eg., United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (lth Cir. 1992) (holding that de-
fendant's support of two minor children and a mother was not an extraordinary circumstance war-
ranting a downward departure); United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 310-311 (1lth Cir. 1992)
(holding that defendant's care of four small children was not an extraordinary circumstance because
the defendant "has shown nothing more than that which innumerable defendants could no doubt
establish: namely that the imposition of prison sentences normally disrupts ... parental relation-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/9
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v. Headley,' the Third Circuit held that the defendant did not have an
extraordinary family circumstance even though she was a single mother
of five young children.45 In Headley, the defendant was convicted of
conspiring to manufacture and distribute illegal drugs.' On appeal, the
defendant argued that the district court's refusal to depart downward
stemmed from its erroneous belief that it lacked the authority to base the
departure only on family circumstances.4 7 The defendant urged that her
tremendous parental responsibility constituted an extraordinary family
circumstance which warranted a downward departure from her sen-
tence.4" The Third Circuit held that although section 5H1.6 authorizes
courts to deviate from the Guidelines in cases of extraordinary family
circumstances, confinement of a single parent to prison is not extraordi-
nary because numerous defendants could establish that prison sentences
disrupt parental relationships.4 9
In contrast, in United States v. Peffa,50 the Tenth Circuit allowed a
downward departure partially based on the defendant's status as a single
parent.51 In Peffa, the district court found that the defendant supported
her two-month-old child, her sixteen-year-old daughter, and her daugh-
ships"); United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 72 (lst Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 112 (1991) (holding
that because defendant's responsibility to his young son is not a situation outside of the "heartland"
of typical cases, it is not extraordinary); United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 121 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991) (holding that even though defendant's young son resided with his
former wife, that he paid child support regularly and that he frequently spoke with his child the
court could not justify departure on the basis of extraordinary family circumstances); United States
v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (ruling that the defendant failed to establish that
her situation, as a single mother of five minor children, was extraordinary); United States v. Pozzy,
902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 353 (1990) (holding that a wife's sentence should
not be reduced on the basis that the penal sentence received by her husband for the same crime is an
extraordinary circumstance and finding that pregnancy is not an extraordinary circumstance);
United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 508 (6th dir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990) (refusing to
justify a departure in case where the defendant was a mother of young children because her situation
was not "sufficiently unusual").
44. 923 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 1082.
46. Id. at 1081-82. The court convicted the defendant of conspiring to manufacture and dis-
tribute both marijuana and cocaine.
47. Id. at 1082.
48. Id. The defendant insisted that a long prison sentence would cause her children to suffer
psychologically.
49. Id. at 1083. The court held, therefore, that the district court did not err in refusing to
depart downward.
50. 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1991). The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. Id.
51. Id. at 1494.
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ter's two-month-old child.52 The district court also found that incarcer-
ating the defendant for a significant period of time would place the
infants at risk.53 The Pefa court held that the language of section 5H1.6
implies that extraordinary family circumstances may justify a sentencing
departure.5 4 The court then reasoned that the defendant's responsibili-
ties to the two infants, combined with other factors," warranted a down-
ward departure from the normal scheme promulgated in the Sentencing
Guidelines.56
In United States v. Johnson 57 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its posi-
tion as the only circuit to premise a downward departure solely upon
extraordinary family circumstances.58 In reaching this decision, the
court first determined the authoritative value of the Guidelines' policy
statements. 59 The court found that the policy statements serve to assist
courts in interpreting the Guidelines but do not convey the same author-
ity as the Guidelines' provisions themselves. 6' Nevertheless, the court
concluded that policy statements can aid courts in deciding whether to
depart from the Guidelines' sentencing ranges.61
Next, the Second Circuit analyzed Policy Statement section 5H1.6 and
determined whether the Commission adequately considered extraordi-
nary family circumstances when formulating the Guidelines.62 The court
52. Id. The defendant's 16-year-old daughter was the mother of the defendant's two-month-
old grandchild.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1495.
55. Id. at 1495. In addition to the defendant's "unique" family responsibilities, the court con-
sidered that her conduct was a deviation from her usual behavior, which did not reflect substance
abuse or prior involvement in the distribution of controlled substances. Id. Prior to her conviction,
the defendant was steadily employed and provided financial support for her family. Id.
56. Id.
57. 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
58. The Second Circuit in United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991), downwardly
departed on the basis of extraordinary family responsibilities when the defendant lived with his wife
of 12 years, his children, his disabled father (who relied on defendant to use his wheelchair) and the
defendant's grandmother. Id. at 1122. At the time of the events giving rise to the conviction, the
defendant provided for his entire family. Id.
59. 964 F.2d at 127. The court first reviewed the relative weight courts should grant to policy
statements because the government's case largely relied on a narrow reading of § 5H1.6. Id. at 126.
60. Id. at 127. The court noted that Congress distinguished policy statements from the Guide-
lines in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), which provides that policy statements are directives "regarding appli-
cation of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing." 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (1988). See supra
note 21.
61. 964 F.2d at 128.
62. Id. The court considered this question the most important to any departure decision. Id.
This inquiry is critical because under § 3553(b) of the Sentencing Act, a district court could only
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/9
FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE GUIDELINES
concluded that the language of section 5H1.6 indicated that the Commis-
sion only considered ordinary family circumstances.63 Because section
5H1.6 contains no express language absolutely prohibiting courts from
considering family circumstances when imposing a sentence, the Johnson
court held that sentencing courts can depart downward after finding the
existence of extraordinary family circumstances."4
Finally, the court evaluated the government's contention that ex-
traordinary family circumstances alone cannot justify a downward de-
parture.65 The court noted that both the Guidelines and case law
support deviating from the Guidelines in extraordinary circumstances.6 6
Moreover, the court found no reason to hold that certain family circum-
stances by themselves do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.67
Examining the defendant's family situation, the court determined that
the defendant's responsibility for providing care to four young children
constituted an extraordinary family circumstance that warranted a
downward departure. 6
The Second Circuit persuasively resolved the sentencing departure is-
sue. First, the court correctly interpreted the relevant policy statement
in the Guidelines.69 The language of section 5H1.6 indicates that the
Commission considered only ordinary family responsibilities when it for-
mulated the Guidelines.70 The Thomas court erred in relying on the sit-
uations designated by section 5H1.6 as the only instances in which a
court can consider family circumstances when imposing a sentence."
This ,position ignores Congress' desire, manifest in the Sentencing Re-
form Act, to have the Commission formulate guidelines which allow
depart if a circumstance was "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 129. The court stated that the Commission would have used unequivocal language
barring family circumstances from departure consideration if it had so intended. Id.
65. Id. In support of this argument, the government showed that all of the cases cited by the
defendant involved other departure bases in addition to that of the extraordinary family circum-
stances. Id.
66. Id. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
67. 964 F.2d at 129.
68. Id. The court stated that the downward departure was not a signal that the defendant's
family circumstances diminished her level of culpability. Rather, the court rationalized the depar-
ture on grounds that a prison sentence would "wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents who
rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing." Id
69. See supra note 22.
70. 964 F.2d at 128-29. See supra notes 22, 63, 64 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
courts to exercise sentencing flexibility when confronted with an unfore-
seen mitigating circumstance.72
Second, the court correctly determined that the Commission intended
for extraordinary family circumstances to justify a downward departure
from applicable sentencing ranges.73 Policy Statement section 5H1.6
does not impose a total prohibition on the consideration of family cir-
cumstances in the sentencing decision.74 Thus, section 5H1.6 stands in
stark contrast to section 5H1.10, which completely bars any considera-
tion of racial status.75 This comparison suggests that the Commission
did not intend to absolutely prohibit consideration of family
circumstances. 6
Third, the Second Circuit properly held that extraordinary family cir-
cumstances by themselves may warrant a sentencing departure.77
Neither the Guidelines nor the policy statements contain any language to
the contrary.78 Moreover, because courts have held in other contexts
that extraordinary circumstances may justify a departure, the argument
that a specific family circumstance standing alone can never justify a de-
parture lacks credibility.79
Finally, the Johnson court failed to consider the problematic message
it sent to other federal appellate courts when it classified the defendant's
family circumstance as extraordinary. Although Johnson's responsibility
for providing for several young children evokes sympathy, the Second
Circuit dangerously construed this circumstance as extraordinary. 80
Most courts confronted with analogous circumstances decline to label
them as extraordinary." Congress intended that the Guidelines provide
72. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 63, 64 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.10 (Policy Statement) (providing that race, sex, national ori-
gin, creed, religion and socio-economic status are not relevant in the determination of a sentence).
76. For a comparison of the language of § 5H1.6 with the stringent language in § 5H.10, see
supra notes 22, 75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
78. Section 5H1.6 contains the Commission's only pertinent statement about this issue. Policy
Statement 5H1.6 provides: "Family ties and responsibilities... are not ordinarily relevant in deter-
mining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. Family responsibilities
that are complied with may be relevant to the determination of the amount of restitution or fines."
U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.6 (Policy Statement).
79. See supra notes 35, 39, 43, 51, 58 (providing examples of other contexts in which courts
have held that extraordinary circumstances warrant a sentencing departure).
80. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 42-43, 49.
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uniformity and fairness in sentencing. 82 In deciding that Johnson's fam-
ily circumstances warranted a departure, the Second Circuit created a
situation totally inconsistent with the Guidelines' underlying purposes of
uniformity and fairness.8 3
Yet, the Johnson decision did not result from flawed reasoning.
Rather, the Guidelines simply failed to provide adequate instructions to
sentencing courts.8 4 Congress should direct the Sentencing Commission
to amend section 5H1.6 to provide the courts adequate guidance in deter-
mining what types of family circumstances constitute extraordinary cir-
cumstances.85 Until Congress takes such action, courts faced with
analogous family circumstances will continue to make disparate depar-
ture determinations.
Donald C. Wayne
82. See supra notes 11, 13. The Sentencing Reform Act directed the Sentencing Commission to
establish guidelines which effectuate certainty in sentencing. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
85. In amending § 5H1.6 to provide for uniformity in the determination of extraordinary fam-
ily circumstances, Congress should primarily consider typical family contingencies. For example,
the following factors might be deemed to determine whether a circumstance is extraordinary: the
number of the defendant's children; whether any of the children has a physical or mental disability
and the degree of such disability; whether the defendant cares and/or provides for the children and
the level of support provided; whether the defendant cares and/or provides for parents or any other
immediate family member; the amount of money available to those dependent upon the defendant in
his or her absence and the availability of friends or relatives to assume the defendant's responsibili-
ties.
Congress, based on the Commission's suggestions, could, for example, create a mini-sentencing
grid as a possible solution to this dilemma. The vertical axis might contain various imprisonment
ranges (in months), which roughly approximate those in the Guidelines' sentencing grid, while vari-
ous mitigating family contingencies, from least to most significant, could shape the horizontal axis.
The grid's boxes could either allow or deny a departure, or leave the decision to the judge's discre-
tion. Those boxes in the upper-left portion of the grid could allow departures, those in the lower-
right portion could deny them and those in between could permit a sentencing judge to use discre-
tion when determining the sentence. Ascertaining a defendant's imprisonment range from the
Guidelines' grid, the judge could simply match the appropriate grid box with the applicable impris-
onment range and the pertinent mitigating family circumstance to determine if such a factor war-
ranted a departure. This system better achieves the aim of the Guidelines to provide sentencing
uniformity with a degree of flexibility. Moreover, Congress could create alternative concepts to
improve sentencing disparities arising from other policy statements.
Because the Commission is not likely to amend § 5H1.6 in the foreseeable future, courts currently
confronting this sentencing departure issue should strive to follow the decisions of other courts fac-
ing the same issue under analogous circumstances. Such a procedure fosters consistency in sentenc-
ing and thus advances the Guidelines' objectives.
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